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Abstract 
 
The United States and Canada lag Europe and Singapore in implementing road pricing on a large scale. 
But the two countries have shown interest in tolling roads as a way to curb congestion and to generate 
revenues. The US is funding congestion pricing demonstration projects through its Value Pricing Pilot 
Program, and Canada has examined new ways to charge for road use and to finance road construction and 
maintenance. This paper reviews the current state of road pricing and funding in the two countries. The 
prospects for extensive road pricing appear to be brighter in the US than in Canada. 
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1. Introduction  
For over a decade the European Union has been studying the application of marginal-
cost-based pricing in transportation, and has issued Green and White Papers as well as 
sponsored a series of research projects. The United States and Canada have not made a 
comparable effort. Nevertheless, the two countries are acutely aware of flaws in the way 
that transportation is currently priced and funded, and they have shown interest in policy 
reform. As far as pricing roads the US has been funding congestion pricing 
demonstration projects through its Value Pricing Pilot Program since 1998. And in 
2001, Canada completed a thorough review of the Canada Transportation Act that 
addressed the case for new ways to charge for road use and to finance road construction 
and maintenance. 
The purpose of this paper is to summarise these and other developments, and to 
identify both the challenges and the prospects for wide-scale implementation of road 
pricing in the two countries. Europe is chosen as the main reference for comparison 
since many readers of this journal will be Europeans, and because there are interesting 
similarities and differences between the two continents. The US and Canada have 
standards of living and systems of government that are similar to the EU. As in the EU, 
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financing, regulation and operation of transportation facilities are divided between 
multiple levels of government: federal, state (US) or provincial (Canada), regional and 
municipal. And the political and acceptability barriers to road pricing are broadly 
similar. There are also some differences. Despite heavy subsidies to North American 
urban transit systems, the automobile is more dominant than in Europe. Urban sprawl is 
greater, and traffic congestion is less concentrated in urban centres. Particularly in the 
US, there is less trust in government and more reliance on the private sector generally. 
Yet private-sector involvement in road pricing has been much less than in the EU. And 
neither the US nor Canada has yet established either networks of interurban toll roads or 
large-scale urban road pricing schemes such as those found in Europe. 
The US and Canada differ in some respects. There is a stronger commitment to public 
funding of transport in Canada, evident also in other sectors such as education and 
health care. But the US federal government is more active in funding urban transport 
projects, and in using transport investments to pursue economic development and 
national security goals. The US also earmarks a majority of federal fuel tax revenues to 
roads, whereas Canada does not. Finally, whereas the US has not ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol, Canada has done so and has an onus to reduce consumption of carbon-based 
fuels. 
The next section reviews in some detail the current state of policy and practice of road 
pricing in the US. Section 3 provides a parallel, but briefer, summary for Canada. 
Section 4 addresses some of the major issues concerning the evolution of road pricing in 
the two countries. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Road pricing in the United States 
 
Toll roads have a long and checkered history in the US going back to the late 1700s.1 
Private roads were widespread in the 1800s, but they rarely made money and 
disappeared as canals and railroads came to dominate long-distance traffic. From time 
to time, state and local governments found toll financing of roads attractive as a way to 
accelerate road construction, as a supplementary source of funding during periods of 
financial stringency2, and as a way to raise money from immediate beneficiaries, 
including non-resident travelers who were not subject to local taxes. 
Currently the US has several hundred tolled facilities. As of January 1, 2003, there 
were 8,440 km of toll roads, bridges and tunnels, of which 8,097 km comprised tolled 
sections of roads inside the US (about 9% of total highway mileage). Electronic toll 
collection was used on 229 facilities.3 Some facilities differentiate tolls by vehicle and 
other characteristics, some offer alternative means of payment, and a modest fraction 
feature time-of-day toll variations. 
 
 
                                                 
1 See Klein and Fielding (1992) and Levinson (2002, Chap. 2). 
2 According to Shoup (2005, p.553, fn 56), financial stringency may also have been a motivating factor in 
installing parking meters during the Great Depression. 
3 US Department of Transportation (2003). The numbers reported in the text are derived by counting each 
section or location of road as a separate facility if it is listed separately in the US DOT (2003) tables. 
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Growing support for road pricing 
For a number of reasons support for road pricing has been growing in the US. 
 
Increasing severity of congestion. According to the Texas Transportation Institute 
(2005), in 2003 the cost of congestion-induced time delays and extra fuel consumption 
amounted to $63.1 billion in 85 major US urban areas. In Los Angeles, the most 
congested city, the annual delay per traveler was 93 hours, and average travel time 
during peak periods was 75% longer than travel time under free-flow conditions.4 These 
figures have grown relatively steadily since at least 1982. 
 
Improved tolling technology. Conventional tollbooths have high administration costs 
and can impose long waits on drivers. But with electronic toll collection and smartcards 
now commonplace, and Global Position System (GPS) technology coming in, there are 
no significant technical barriers to direct and differentiated charges for road use. 
 
Limitations of traditional supply and demand policies. Building new roads is 
constrained by tight public budgets, lack of space and environmental concerns. Public 
transport systems are very expensive, and ill-suited to the decentralised urban structure 
and diverse trip patterns that characterise most US cities. And travel-demand 
management strategies, though numerous, have a limited potential to control automobile 
use (Meyer, 1999). 
 
Limitations of existing funding mechanisms. Road construction and maintenance in 
the US is funded primarily by indirect user charges rather than tolls. All 50 states have 
gasoline taxes. Federal funding is provided through the Highway Trust Fund (HTF), 
which was established in 1956 to finance the federal share of the Interstate highway 
network and to support other federal-aid highway projects. Revenues for the HTF are 
derived from taxes on fuel, tires, truck sales and heavy-vehicle use. The HTF and the 
primary reliance for funding on fuel and other indirect taxes have come under attack on 
several scores5: 
 
1. Although tax rates are linked to vehicle characteristics, a Highway Cost Allocation 
study (US DOT, 1997, 2000) concluded that heavy combination trucks pay only 
about 80% of their costs, whereas automobiles and other light vehicles cover 110%. 
The system therefore does not adhere to the user pays principle as far as major user 
groups. 
2. Although the HTF was established as an earmarked fund for roads, only a portion 
(roughly 65%-75%) of the money is now actually spent on road projects. 
3. Money in the HTF is allocated according to geographical distribution formulas that 
guarantee states revenues regardless of whether the revenues can be put to good use, 
and that inflate demand for spending. 
4. Despite the popularity of fuel-inefficient Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs), the 
average fuel efficiency of the vehicle fleet in the US will probably improve in the 
future. Coupled with the growth of alternative-fuel vehicles, this will dampen 
gasoline consumption. State and federal fuel tax rates are difficult to increase, and 
the recent hike in world oil prices is likely to make it all the harder. Maintenance 
                                                 
4 Texas Transportation Institute (2005, Table 1). 
5 See, for example, Orski (2005) and Roth (2005). 
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expenditures, meanwhile, are rising as the Interstate Highway system ages and rising 
traffic levels impose more wear and tear on roads of all types. 
 
Due to these and other problems, the HTF is increasingly seen as both inappropriate 
and inadequate to continue as the primary highway funding mechanism. 
 
 
Value Pricing Pilot Program projects 
 
During the 1970s the US federal government attempted unsuccessfully to initiate 
congestion pricing demonstration projects in several cities. Fears of adverse impacts on 
businesses and the poor, and insufficient efforts to gain constituency support, were 
largely responsible for the failure (Elliott, 1986; Higgins, 1986). But road pricing has 
since gained momentum thanks to two breakthrough pieces of federal legislation: the 
Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991, and the 
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) of 1998. TEA-21 authorised 
the Value Pricing Pilot Program (VPPP)6 to fund innovative road and parking pricing 
measures for alleviating congestion, and permitted limited tolling on Interstate 
highways. Table 1 lists the projects that have been funded to date. 
 
Table 1: US Value Pricing Pilot Program projects in operation and under development. 
Project category Operational Under development 
1 New lanes 2  HOT lanes 6  HOT lanes 
2  managed lanes 
1  queue jump 
2 Previously toll-free roads 4  HOT lanes 4  conversion HOV to HOT lanes 
4  FAIR lanes 
1  cordon toll 
3 Existing or new toll roads, 
bridges and tunnels 
4  variable tolls 4  variable tolls 
1  variable pricing 
1  discount truck tolls 
4 Parking and vehicle use 1 car sharing 
1 cash-out of free 
parking 
1 cash out of cars 
1  mileage-based insurance 
1  variabilisation of fixed auto costs 
1  financing infrastructure 
1  GPS-based pricing 
Total 13 28 
Sources: DeCorla-Souza (2004), Value Pricing Pilot Program (2005) and Congestion Pricing Listserv. 
 
 
All of the operational projects in the first two categories feature High-Occupancy Toll 
(HOT) lanes. HOT lanes are a variant of High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes that 
allow vehicles carrying fewer people than the HOV occupancy requirement (usually 2 
or 3 people) to use the lanes if they pay a toll (or a surcharge over the existing HOV 
fee). General-purpose toll-free lanes run parallel to the HOT lanes. 
 
                                                 
6 Value Pricing Pilot Program (2005). See also Transportation Research Board (2003) and DeCorla-Souza 
(2004).  
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Table 2 provides information on the five HOT lane facilities that are currently in 
operation. The HOT lanes on State Route 91 (SR-91) were built in 1995 before the 
VPPP was launched. The lanes were privately operated until 2003 (see Section 4). Tolls 
vary hourly according to a schedule that depends on day of week, with a goal of 
maintaining free-flow conditions on the HOT lanes. A number of studies have examined 
how the tolls affect ridesharing, lane and departure-time choices of users.7 
 
Table 2: Operational High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lane projects. 
Facility Launch 
date 
Location Time variation  Differentiation by 
vehicle & 
occupancy 
Use of 
revenues 
State 
Route 91 
(SR-91) 
1995 Orange County, 
CA 
Variable 
(scheduled) 
Range: $1.05-
$7.75 
HOV3+ free Operations, 
maintenance, 
corridor 
improvements 
Interstate 
15 (I-15) 
1997 San Diego 
County, CA 
Dynamic (6 min. 
changes) 
Range: $0.25-
$8.00 
HOV2+ free Express bus 
service & 
operations 
Interstate 
10 (I-10, 
Katy 
Freeway) 
1998 HOV3+ free 
SOVs prohibited 
on toll lanes 
Northwest 
Freeway 
(US 290) 
 
2000 
Houston, Texas Flat $2 during 
peak 
As I-10, except 
lanes available 
only during 
morning peak 
Operations 
I-394  2005 Minneapolis-
St. Paul 
Dynamic (3 min. 
changes) 
Range: $0.25-
$8.00 
HOV2+ free Capital costs, 
operations, 
improvements, 
bus transit 
Sources: Appiah and Burris (2005), Burris and Stockton (2004), DeCorla-Souza (2004), Munnich and 
Loveland (2005). 
 
 
Interstate 15 (I-15) was the first facility on which pre-existing HOV lanes were 
converted to HOT status. By law, I-15 is required to maintain a level of service of C or 
better on the HOT lanes. This is accomplished by varying tolls “dynamically” as often 
as every six minutes. A schedule is published that shows average toll levels by time of 
day. The normal maximum toll is $4, but tolls may be raised up to $8 in the event of 
severe traffic congestion. Drivers who plan to use the HOT lanes therefore face 
uncertainty about how much they will pay, but they are (nearly) guaranteed a 
congestion-free trip. By contrast, on SR-91 the toll paid is predictable but travel time 
can vary with unexpected demand or capacity fluctuations. 
The two HOT lane projects in Houston, Texas, carry very low traffic volumes 
compared to SR-91 and I-15, and the tolls remain “flat” at $2 rather than varying over 
time. The most recent project, I-394 in Minneapolis, involved a conversion of existing 
HOV lanes to HOT lanes and construction of new tolled lanes, and is therefore tallied in 
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both Categories 1 and 2 of Table 1. As on I-15, tolls vary dynamically with the goal of 
maintaining free-flow conditions on the tolled lanes. 
Category 1 in Table 1 also includes managed lanes and queue jumps. The term 
managed lanes refers to demand management, and the concept encompasses various 
facility types: HOV lanes, HOT lanes, Single Occupancy Vehicle (SOV) express lanes, 
special use lanes and truck lanes. Queue jumps are elevated roads that allow drivers to 
avoid congested intersections by “jumping” over them. Being relatively cheap, queue 
jumps are affordable for areas with small populations. 
Fast And Intertwined Regular (FAIR) lanes in Category 2 entail conversion of some 
freeway lanes to toll lanes, while leaving other lanes free (Decorla-Souza, 2004). Toll-
lane revenues are used to give drivers on the free lanes credits that can be used either for 
future trips on the toll lanes or other purposes (transit, parking, etc.). FAIR lanes are 
designed to enhance acceptability by allocating toll revenues directly to users of the 
freeway in a revenue-neutral way. 
One project in Category 2 features a cordon toll around Fort Myers Beach, Florida: an 
island community where additional roadways are not practical and where the limited 
number of access points makes cordon pricing viable. A cordon toll was proposed for 
New York City by the mayor, Michael Bloomberg, but withdrawn in the face of 
opposition.8  
The third project category in Table 1 covers toll roads, bridges and tunnels. Unlike 
with HOT lanes, all lanes on these facilities are tolled. A majority involve variable (i.e. 
time-varying) tolls.9 The fourth and final category in Table 1 encompasses a wide range 
of usage and area-based pricing schemes. A common motivation underlying these 
schemes is that the existing system of transport prices in the US is biased in favour of 
auto travel in two ways. First, auto usage is underpriced or unpriced on average. For 
example, fuel taxes do not cover environmental and other external costs of driving. 
Also, 91% of commuters drive to work and 95% of auto commuters park free at work.10 
Second, a large fraction of the total costs of driving are fixed charges (vehicle 
depreciation, insurance, registration, licensing fees, etc.) that do not vary with usage and 
contribute to the underpricing of driving at the margin. 
The project on cashing-out free parking in Category 4 offers commuters cash, transit 
passes or another alternative to free parking with comparable value.11 Mileage-based 
insurance is being studied in the form of Pay As You Drive (PAYD) insurance 
premiums that are paid in proportion to distance travelled. PAYD insurance is a form of 
road pricing because it charges for road use. The per-kilometre premium rate can be 
conditioned on driver characteristics that are used for pricing insurance today, such as 
age, sex, and safety record. PAYD insurance is superior to “pay at the pump” insurance 
                                                 
8 A new proposal for a peak-period charge in Manhattan was made in November, 2005, by the city's 
major business association (http://nytimes.com/2005/11/11/nyregion/11traffic.html). In an attempt to 
forestall further opposition, several roadways would remain free. 
9 For details see DeCorla-Souza (2004, pp.295-301). 
10 Shoup (2005, p.267 and Appendix B). The supply of parking in the US is also artificially inflated by 
minimum parking requirements, which according to Shoup (2005) are often arbitrary, vary greatly from 
city to city, and can be extremely onerous on developers. 
11 The advantages of cashing-out free parking (especially in the US) are explained by Shoup (2005, 
pp.262-266). Shoup also describes (pp. 383-390) high-technology parking meters that can adjust parking 
rates by time of day and expected parking occupancy rates in the neighbourhood. Such meters have been 
installed in a few US cities, but they are far more prevalent in European cities where parking space is 
scarcer, and the need for efficient rationing more pressing. 
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proposals under which costs would vary (inappropriately for insurance purposes) with 
vehicle fuel efficiency, but would be independent of driver characteristics.12  
Arguably the most ambitious of the VPPP projects is Oregon’s GPS- and distance-
based pricing proposal. The long run plan is to charge for all driving within the state, 
with charges proportional to distance traveled and varying by type of road and time of 
day. Travel would be monitored by GPS and payments would be paid at the pump when 
the vehicle is refuelled.13 State fuel taxes would be refunded. The project faces a 
number of stumbling blocks including the cost of installing fuel-pump infrastructure and 
on-board vehicle equipment, the need for a long transition period to deal with vehicles 
that lack GPS or odometer-based devices and that would be too costly to retrofit, the 
shift of burden away from fuel-inefficient vehicles, lack of agreement on whether 
revenues should be spent on highways or other modes, and privacy concerns related to 
GPS. 
 
 
Summary of US developments 
 
The HOT lane projects have been the biggest success of the VPPP so far. A number 
of reasons can be offered. First, the projects have relatively small set-up and operating 
costs. Second, three of the projects (SR-91, I-15 and I-394) are designed to minimise 
congestion. This goal is readily explained and motivated to politicians and the public. It 
can be verified by examining loop-detector data on traffic flows and speeds, and the 
benefits are readily visible both to users of the lanes and those who drive on the parallel 
toll-free lanes just a few metres away. Third, availability of the toll-free lanes enhances 
acceptability by giving drivers a choice whether to pay for an essentially identical trip in 
terms of route. Contrary to the view that toll lanes will be used only by the rich as 
“Lexus Lanes”, lower-income and unemployed individuals and off-peak commuters 
occasionally use them when they are especially pressed for time. Fourth, revenues are 
earmarked, either for operations or public transport alternatives. Fifth, environmentalists 
have come to see congestion pricing generally, and HOT lanes in particular, as a way to 
improve air quality by keeping traffic moving smoothly.14 
It is of some interest that the five existing HOT lane projects differ in terms of 
whether the lanes are new or converted from HOV lanes, vehicle occupancy 
requirements, the extent of time variation of tolls, and the allocation of revenues (cf. 
Table 2). This suggests either that there is some flexibility in the design of successful 
schemes or, alternatively, that the design needs to be tailored to the particular 
circumstances of the facility in question. A number of other HOT lane projects are 
                                                 
12 Two recent theoretical studies have come out in favour of variabilisation. Edlin (2003) has determined 
that, by pricing congestion through a percentage tax on per-mile premiums, sizeable (and comparable) 
benefits would result from reductions in congestion and accident costs. Greenberg (2003) proposes a 10% 
federal subsidy to states, insurance companies and other companies for converting taxes and other fixed 
auto costs to a per-kilometre basis. He finds that the subsidy compares well with most existing policies in 
terms of cost-effectiveness for improving air quality and reducing traffic fatalities. 
13 For details see Forkenbrock (2004) and Whitty et al. (2005). 
14 A sixth possible benefit of HOT lanes is that by maintaining free-flowing conditions they actually 
support higher traffic throughput per lane than toll-free lanes. This has been confirmed from traffic counts 
on SR-91 (Poole and Orski, 2003, p.6) but the idea that congestion pricing can increase throughput in 
general is controversial. See, for example, postings to the Congestion Pricing Forum listserv between 
September 28 and October 12, 2005. 
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under development, and new projects are frequently being announced. One factor 
working in favour of HOV-to-HOT lane conversion projects is that most HOV lanes are 
underutilised in the US and can accommodate a large percentage increase in vehicle 
loads before speeds begin to deteriorate.15 Most other countries do not have this “slack”, 
and therefore cannot expect to replicate US success with HOT lanes. 
The HOT lane and other VPPP projects provide several lessons that may carry over to 
other road-pricing initiatives. One is that new tolls are politically feasible if the 
locations and designs of the schemes are chosen carefully. A second is that variable and 
even dynamic pricing is acceptable. Focus groups were strongly opposed to dynamic 
pricing on I-15 before it began operation (Godbe Research & Analysis, 1997). But 
dynamic pricing is now accepted, and it has achieved a better balance between peak and 
off-peak periods. Indeed, Sullivan (2002, p.3) remarks that “There appear to be no 
differences in consumers' acceptance or ability to comprehend any of these current 
systems, regardless of their complexity.” In part, drivers may accept dynamic pricing 
because they value highly reliable travel times. A third lesson is that effective marketing 
of new schemes to the public is vital. As Berg (2003, p.38) notes: 
 
“If value pricing is to be implemented, it has to be seen as the logical solution 
arrived at through public participation, not something that has been developed in 
isolation by ‘experts’. Just as new products are introduced with marketing 
campaigns, new public policies need to be ‘marketed’ to the public.” 
 
This lesson is echoed by European experience (e.g. Schade and Schlag, 2003). 
The new life imparted to road pricing by the ISTEA and TEA-21 legislation has been 
extended with passage, in August 2005, of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)16 which authorises the 
Federal highway and transit programs for 2005-2009. In addition to continuing the 
VPPP, SAFETEA-LU includes existing or new programs that permit tolls to be 
collected for the purpose of constructing, reconstructing or rehabilitating Interstate 
highways. It includes a new Express Lanes Demonstration Program to permit tolling for 
congestion relief, emissions reductions, and building new Interstate lanes to reduce 
congestion. The Act also creates two commissions to assess the adequacy of the 
Highway Trust Fund to provide long-term transportation funding, and to consider 
supplementary or alternative revenue sources besides the fuel tax.17 
 
 
3. Road pricing in Canada 
 
The history of toll roads in Canada broadly resembles that in the US: early 
enthusiasm, followed by retrenchment and sporadic implementation thereafter. During 
the nineteenth century many toll bridges, roads, and ferries were owned and operated by 
municipalities and private companies (Bryan, 1972). Most were subsequently abolished 
                                                 
15 Safirova et al. (2004) convincingly demonstrate this using a simulation model for Washington, D.C. 
16 See US Department of Transport (2005). 
17 See http://trb.org/news/blurb_detail.asp?id=4795, accessed October 30, 2005. 
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by provincial governments. Currently, there are only 19 operational tolled facilities 
comprising 385 km of toll roads in Canada, compared to over 8,000 km in the US.18 
Ownership, operations and institutional structures of the facilities vary considerably. 
A majority are bridges or tunnels linking Ontario and the US. The prevalence of tolling 
at border crossings is consistent with the use of tolls to extract revenues from 
nonresidents. Three large facilities have been built by diverse mechanisms. The 
Coquihalla highway, which opened in 1986 and traverses 115 km of mountainous 
terrain between Hope and Merritt in British Columbia, is public. By contrast, Highway 
407 in Toronto was publicly funded, but it is now owned and operated by a consortium, 
Highway 407 International. The Confederation Bridge which links Prince Edward 
Island to the mainland was financed, designed, built and operated privately. Tolls are 
levied, but most of the debt is being repaid from government subsidies rather than toll 
revenues. 
Of the 19 tolled facilities, electronic tolls are collected on only five (Nix, 2002). All 
facilities differentiate charges by vehicle type and size.19 But in contrast to the VPPP 
projects, only Highway 407 charges by time of day. Freedom of mobility is respected in 
that, except for non-local trucks on Highway 104 in Nova Scotia, no user is forced to 
take a toll road.20 Highway 407 is by far the most heavily used facility. When it began 
operating as a toll road in 1997, it was the world’s first all-electronic open access toll 
highway.21 Tolling was facilitated politically by proximity to Highway 401: a toll-free 
and heavily congested alternative running roughly in parallel a few kilometres to the 
south. 
Tolling roads in Canada has been spurred by factors similar to those in the US, 
although the impetus is not as strong for several reasons. First, there is a greater 
commitment to public funding in Canada, not only for roads but also for public 
transport. Second, traffic volumes and congestion are lower. And third, because of the 
size of Canada’s provinces and their “linear” configuration from east-to-west, the 
provinces are generally better able than are US states to tax non-resident users while 
they are in transit, and correspondingly less reliant on tolls for revenue. 
Roads in Canada are mostly paid for with general tax revenues and property taxes. 
Road users in aggregate approximately pay their way22, whereas transit and other modes 
are heavily subsidised. The extent of user-pays varies by province as a function of 
                                                 
18 A major bridge across the Fraser River in Vancouver is scheduled to open in 2008. Tolls will be 
collected electronically, and will vary by vehicle type and method of payment, but not time of day. See 
http://www.translink.bc.ca/goldenearsbridge/project_information/funding.asp, accessed November 19, 
2005. 
19 An axle-based system was introduced on the Confederation Bridge on January 1, 2006. Prior to this, 
tolls were based on rates for the ferry service that the bridge replaced. See 
http://www.confederationbridge.com/images/New_Toll_Structure.pdf, accessed November 18, 2005. 
20 Canadian policy has generally supported the availability of toll-free alternatives. According to Bryan 
(1972, p.47), during the brief revival of tolling in the 1950s “… it was generally accepted in principle that 
there ought to be an alternative to any toll route”. Legislation passed in Québec permits toll facilities 
where an alternative un-tolled route exists (Nix 2001, p.9). And British Columbia’s guidelines for tolling 
stipulate that “Tolls will be implemented only if a reasonable untolled alternative is available.” See 
British Columbia Ministry of Transport (2003, para. 2.3).  
21 Mylvaganam and Borins (2004) provide an insightful history of the toll road. 
22 According to Transport Canada (2004, Table 3-5) for 2003/2004 spending by all levels of government 
on roads amounted to CDN 13,647 million, equal to 69.4% of total spending on transport. Revenues from 
road users were CDN 13,989 million. In the three previous years, spending exceeded revenues by small 
margins. 
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traffic volumes and road construction costs (Nix, 2001, p.5). Canada lacks formal 
mechanisms for road funding on a scale comparable to the US Highway Trust Fund, and 
no legislation similar to ISTEA, TEA-21 or SAFETEA-LU has been passed. Only about 
7% of federal fuel tax revenues are spent on roads and highways. And until recently the 
federal government provided almost no funds for urban transport. But under the New 
Deal for Cities and Communities, the government has allocated $5 billion in federal 
gasoline excise tax funding to cities over a five-year period.23 
 
 
Federal policy recommendations 
 
Transportation policy in Canada has been reviewed by three major federal studies in 
the last 15 years: the 1992 Royal Commission on National Passenger Transportation, 
the 1993 National Transportation Act Review Commission, and the Canada 
Transportation Act Review (CTAR) of 2001. In general these studies supported the 
subsidiarity principle, the user pays principle, and recognition of environmental costs in 
transport pricing. In addition to toll roads, the CTAR Panel investigated road funds and 
urban transportation agencies as financing arrangements for roads. All ten Canadian 
provinces have at some time employed earmarked taxes. But currently most fuel tax 
revenues and other user charges are added to the general account. There have been 
attempts to create provincial road funds. But these funds were either short-lived, or 
failed to be fully self-financing from user charges.24 The federal government has 
recently created several infrastructure funds, but the amounts are modest and none of 
the funds are earmarked specifically for roads. Urban transportation agencies have been 
established in Montreal and Vancouver, the second and third largest cities in Canada.25 
These agencies have mandates that include public transit as well as roads, and powers to 
raise revenues through new charges on motorists. This gives them multiple objectives, 
as well as multiple instruments to assemble policy packages. 
 
 
Climate change 
Climate change is a factor that distinguishes Canada from the US. Only Canada has 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and Canada could be affected more strongly by global 
warming because of its northern latitudes. It is an open question whether the two 
countries will adhere to their current positions, and if so whether greener policies will 
be pursued more vigorously north of the 49th parallel. If Canada does follow through 
with its Kyoto commitment, there may be a concerted attempt to reduce consumption of 
fossil fuels for transport. The implications for road pricing are ambiguous. Because 
greenhouse gas emissions can be effectively targeted with a carbon tax, tolls or other 
usage-based charges do not appear to be required on this score. Moreover, with global 
warming there may be less damage to roads from the freeze-thaw cycle, and 
correspondingly less expenditure on road maintenance. However, reductions in fuel 
                                                 
23 http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/ndcc/index_e.shtml, accessed November 20, 2005. 
24 See Nix (2001, p.14, Section 5) and CTAR (2001a, p.186). 
25 The two agencies are L’Agence métropolitaine de transport (http://www.amt.qc.ca) created in 1996, 
and TransLink (http://www.translink.bc.ca) created in 1998. Both agencies were created before the CTAR 
was conducted. 
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consumption will reduce the base for fuel taxes, and consequently increase the need for 
other revenue sources.  
 
 
4. Some questions about road pricing in the US and Canada 
 
A number of questions and issues regarding road pricing have come to the fore in 
recent years. Attention is limited here to a few questions of concern to the US and 
Canada. 
 
 
Design of road pricing schemes 
An overarching question that has been addressed in European-Union funded 
research26, and is currently under debate in the UK, is how to phase in road pricing over 
time. An implementation path has several dimensions: the numbers of steps or phases, 
the design at each step, the speed of progression from step to step, and the ultimate form 
and extent of road pricing. Since road pricing in the US and Canada has not yet 
progressed very far, discussion is focused here on the design of schemes rather than on 
the time dimension of implementation. 
Road pricing schemes can be categorised as facility-based, area-based or network-
based. Facility-based schemes include HOT lanes and individual highways. Toll 
cordons, area licenses and urban parking-fee structures are types of area-based schemes. 
Network-based schemes include highway networks, and systems that encompass all 
road travel such as GPS-based distance pricing. As Section 2 explains, most of the 
VPPP projects are facility-based. The prospects for area-based and network-based 
schemes in the US and Canada are briefly assessed here.  
 
Area-based schemes 
 
Fort Myers Beach in Florida is the only urban area in the US or Canada with a cordon 
toll, and no area charges have been implemented or initiated anywhere. To be sure, 
several schemes have recently been proposed. As noted in Section 2, a cordon toll was 
proposed for New York City and withdrawn, and a revised scheme has been put 
forward. The San Francisco County Transportation Authority has applied for a federal 
grant to study an area charge similar to that in London.27 A toll for driving into 
downtown Boston during the morning peak was recommended by a city councillor.28 
                                                 
26 See in particular the MC-ICAM project (http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/rtd/5/index_ 
en.htm) accessed November 19, 2005. 
27 http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/06/04/CONGESTION.TMP. Accessed 
November 19, 2005. 
28 http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/04/01/blocking_traffic/ 
Accessed November 19, 2005. 
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And TransLink, Vancouver’s urban transportation agency, drew up a plan for tolls in 
2004 but abandoned it after the New Deal for Cities and Communities was announced.29  
These and other area-based road-pricing proposals have met various criticisms: 
• travel patterns are dispersed in most North American cities. Congestion is not 
concentrated in city centres, and any charge schemes for downtown areas would 
have limited effectiveness30; 
• motorists will divert around charge areas, resulting in displacement rather than 
suppression of congestion; 
• public transport capacity is inadequate to accommodate a significant modal shift 
away from driving; 
• business and commercial activity would be displaced to toll-free locations; 
• those who would pay the charge (viz. suburban residents who work in the city) 
outnumber those who would benefit (viz. city-centre residents); and 
• state or provincial legislation would be required, and various horizontal or vertical 
agreements between government departments would have to be made.  
 
London’s area charge appears to have been successful because these difficulties were 
avoided (Litman, 2005). Few cities in North America seem as well-suited. This is not to 
say that area charges will not work anywhere, but one should not assume that positive 
experiences in one jurisdiction will necessarily be repeated elsewhere. 
 
Network-based schemes 
 
Four types of toll-road networks have recently been approved or recommended for the 
US. One, proposed by Poole and Orski (2003), are urban networks of HOT lanes and 
Bus Rapid Transit. These networks would comprise interconnected limited-access 
freeway lanes that are converted from HOV lanes and designed for relatively long-haul 
travel. Dynamic tolls would be levied on all vehicles except buses, and the revenues 
would be used to fund network construction on an incremental basis. 
A second type of toll-road network for intercity travel has been launched in Texas. 
The Trans-Texas Corridor project (http://www.texastollways.com) already comprises 
more than 20 ventures. The long-range plan calls for 1,560 lane-km of new toll lanes on 
existing or new expressways. Construction of the lanes would be financed by private 
investors, who would be repaid from toll revenues. To exploit scale economies and 
revenue opportunities new highway corridors would be built that are wide enough to 
accommodate railway tracks as well as gas lines and other utilities. 
A third type of toll-road network for trucks has been proposed by Samuel et al. 
(2002). Toll truckways would be established along Interstate rights-of-way in lanes 
separated from other traffic to enhance safety. The truckways could be owned and 
operated either privately or by the states. Tolls would be based on distance and 
conditioned on truck characteristics such as axle loads. To avoid double taxation, state 
and federal fuel taxes would be rebated. Size and weight regulations would also be 
                                                 
29 http://www.tricitynews.com/portals-code/listcgi?paper=74&cat=23&id=502071&more, article dated 
October 2, 2005. 
30 According to Richardson and Bae (2004) differences between the US and Europe in land-use and travel 
patterns have been diminishing over time. 
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relaxed to permit trucking companies to use larger, more economical, vehicles. Samuel 
et al. (2002) claim that toll truckways would be self-financing under a wide range of 
scenarios, and that states would gain more from reductions in construction and 
maintenance costs than they would lose in fuel tax revenues. To take full advantage of 
the technology it would need to be harmonised with Canada and Mexico, as required 
under the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement. Harmonisation would be 
especially desirable for Canada given the large volume of cross-border trucking traffic 
between Canada and the US.31 
The fourth type of road-pricing scheme, credit-based congestion pricing (CBCP), has 
been proposed by Kockelman and Kalmanje (2005). CBCP adds revenue neutrality to 
congestion pricing by giving each resident of a prescribed area a monthly allowance of 
travel credits equal to the average amount spent on tolls by residents (after deducting 
administrative costs) in the previous month. Individuals who drive less than average can 
either save the credit for future travel or exchange it for cash. Only those who travel 
more than average incur an out-of-pocket expense. Kalmanje and Kockelman (2004) 
conducted simulations of CBCP on the Austin, Texas, road network and found that it 
greatly increased the proportion of residents who benefit from pricing. 
Networks of toll roads have some attractive properties. They embody scale economies 
for users similar to airline and public transit networks in that travel is possible between 
many origins and destinations. There are also likely to be scale economies in toll 
collection costs for both users and operators. And political approval might even be 
easier to gain than for single facilities insofar as spatial equity is promoted by providing 
a common type of service across multiple regions. Nevertheless, toll-road networks face 
design challenges and obstacles. 
One issue is how to set tolls. Differences between links in construction costs and 
congestion levels would appear to call for differences in tolls to satisfy the user pays 
and efficient pricing principles. If tolls are set dynamically – as Poole and Orski (2003) 
recommend for urban networks – toll differences might be accepted. However, there are 
advantages in the Japanese Revenue Pooling System, established in 1972, whereby all 
routes have the same tolls regardless of construction costs and traffic levels.32 The 
rationale offered for this system is that it minimises confusion for drivers and is seen to 
be fair. Furthermore, full cost recovery from toll revenues is unlikely to be possible for 
especially costly links that are nevertheless vital parts of the network. A system of 
common tolls may also forestall local governments from exploiting tolls as a cash cow – 
a danger that Heaver and Waters (2005, p.796) warn about in the Canadian context. 
A second concern about toll-road networks that also arises with facility-based tolling 
is route diversion. This is perceived to be a problem, or potential problem, for small 
states that can be circumvented by using highways in neighbouring states. Levying tolls 
on Interstate highways or major urban arterials may also induce traffic to divert onto 
two-lane roads or residential streets, and exacerbate congestion as well as compromise 
safety. 
Toll-road networks will face regulatory hurdles. In the case of toll truckways several 
policy changes would be required (Samuel et al., 2002): (i) further relaxation of 
prohibitions on tolls on Interstate highways, (ii) provision of truck rights-of-way along 
                                                 
31 According to Transport Canada (2004, p.61), in 2003 approximately 63% of Canada-US trade was 
transported by truck. 
32 See World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/transport/roads/toll_rds.htm) Annex 9, accessed 
November 20, 2005. Cross-financing of intercity concession motorways is also practiced in France. 
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existing corridors “on the federal-aid system”, (iii) relaxation of truck size and weight 
regulations, and (iv) procedures to issue rebates on federal and state truck user taxes. In 
this regard Samuel et al. (2002) comment favourably on Canadian regulatory policy, 
and note (p.12) that, in contrast to the US: 
 
“Canadian trucking has benefited from its federal government acting as a facilitator 
rather than as a decisionmaker about truck sizes and weights. Provincial 
governments take final responsibility for the difficult trade-off decisions about 
which roads are designated for what class of heavy vehicles…” 
 
Two points are worth noting. One is that both the subsidiarity principle and 
harmonisation – central concepts in European Union transport policy reform – also 
matter in North America. As far as subsidiarity there are advantages in having a number 
of jurisdictions (e.g. states in the US, or provinces in Canada) experimenting 
independently with ways to provide roads, particularly in light of rapid technological 
change. The second point is that to make toll truckways possible, let alone to realise 
their full potential, multiple regulatory changes are required that go well beyond pricing. 
 
 
Scheme complexity 
 
The difficulties of designing second-best policies in the real world of myriad 
economic distortions are well known, and opinions differ on what approach to take. 
Delucchi (2000) maintains that getting the price right may be impractical or impossible 
because of difficulties in estimating demand elasticities, externality costs, etc. But in a 
comment on Delucchi (2000), Litman and Greenberg (2000) argue that, besides road 
congestion and non-market externalities, various other price distortions apply to auto 
travel that are larger in total: unpaid parking, infrastructure costs and the heavy reliance 
on fixed costs that leave automobile travel severely underpriced at the margin (recall 
Section 2). Estimates from US studies cited by Litman and Greenberg (2000) indicate 
that efficient pricing would increase variable vehicle expenses by 200-500% over 
current levels. With respect to the implications for pricing policy they remark (p.7): 
 
“The conceptual test of additional vehicle use charges need not be the theoretical 
ideal based on Marginal Social Cost, but rather, it simply needs to be better than 
existing taxes and fees. This is a far easier standard to meet.” 
 
In their view, politics in the US are such that auto usage will always be underpriced, 
so that there is little risk in taking initial steps towards raising prices by whatever 
means. This assessment is almost surely more accurate for the US than for European 
countries, particularly those with lower levels of auto ownership and/or high fuel taxes 
such as Britain. 
 
 
Earmarking of toll revenues 
A longstanding question that goes beyond transportation is whether revenues from 
user charges should be earmarked for specific purposes. Practice varies widely. As 
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noted in Section 2, earmarking is the rule for VPPP projects, and the US Highway Trust 
Fund is earmarked in principle if not in practice. Earmarking is less common in Canada. 
Simple economic theory suggests that use of revenues should be kept flexible because 
the relative merits of different spending patterns change over time in ways that cannot 
be foreseen. However, earmarking can also be defended as a means of compensating 
losers, as well as a way to prevent politicians from misallocating funds. 
Many recent studies of road pricing support earmarking as necessary to gain political 
or public approval. But earmarking has been opposed by some authoritative sources. 
The National Research Council committee on congestion pricing disagreed with the 
spending constraints written into the ISTEA legislation that enabled the VPPP. The US 
National Research Council Committee noted that voters might approve spending 
revenues for other purposes, and local governments should have the latitude to comply 
with their wishes.33 Similarly, the Canada Transportation Act Review (CTAR) Panel 
recommended that congestion and other road charges should not be allocated to road 
investments if expenditures on other transport modes would yield a higher return.34 
However, Heaver and Waters (2005, p.795) recommend that revenues from the 
Canadian federal fuel tax should be dedicated to transport as a whole. Amongst other 
reasons they point out the pressing need for funds to rehabilitate road infrastructure, and 
the fact that the fuel tax is inconsistent with harmonisation of tax rates across economic 
sectors. 
 
 
Policy towards environmental costs of driving 
It is generally, but not universally, argued that drivers should pay for the 
environmental externalities they generate, but also that environmental charges should be 
levied on all economic sectors rather than just transportation. Fuel taxes are potentially 
effective for internalising climate change costs, but rather crude for addressing the 
health and other costs of local emissions. Tolls are being touted in the US primarily as a 
tool for pricing congestion rather than environmental externalities. One question that 
looms in the future is how to tackle environmental costs through fiscal measures if road 
pricing becomes widespread as either a supplement or a replacement for fuel taxes. One 
concern with Oregon’s proposed distance-based toll, which would replace fuel taxes, is 
that it would penalise fuel-efficient vehicles unless toll rates are conditioned on vehicle 
characteristics. 
Another, more immediate problem, is how to treat vehicles with non-conventional 
fuels that are rapidly gaining in popularity. Some states and cities already provide 
incentives in the form of tax credits, exemptions from emissions-testing and even free 
parking. And with passage of the SAFETEA-LU Act, states can now grant free access 
to HOV and HOT lanes not only to electric and alternative-powered vehicles, but also to 
hybrid vehicles. These privileges have raised objections from owners of regular 
vehicles, and are also opposed on efficiency grounds since they undermine the primary 
goal of HOV and HOT lanes to combat congestion. 
 
                                                 
33 Transportation Research Board (1994, p.73). 
34 CTAR (2001b, Recommendation 12.3). This recommendation applies both in the short term with 
respect to fuel tax revenues, and in the longer term with respect to any road funds that might be 
established. 
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Scope for private-sector involvement 
The private sector plays a leading role in toll-road development in Europe, Australia 
and other parts of the world, in part because this is facilitated by government policy 
(Orski, 2005). Relatively speaking, the private sector has had a low profile in the US 
and Canada. Nevertheless, more than 50 urban toll roads have been developed in the 
US, most of them in the last 30 years (Poole, 2005a). Prominent examples include State 
Route 91, the Dulles Greenway in North Virginia, and the Chicago Skyway. In addition 
to Texas, where public-private partnerships (PPPs) are blooming, laws enabling PPPs in 
transportation projects have been passed in over 20 other states. And the federal 
government is encouraging private-sector involvement through its Special Experimental 
Project initiative (SEP-15). Amongst various projects under consideration are a series of 
new HOT lanes on the Capital Beltway in Washington, D.C. In Canada, Highway 407 is 
the only privately operated urban road – albeit a very profitable one with over 300,000 
average daily trips on workdays. 
From a public-sector perspective the main goal in harnessing the private sector is to 
attract private funding and/or operation of tolled facilities while avoiding both heavy 
subsidisation and exploitation of monopoly power. One challenge is that start-up 
projects are inherently risky because costs are high, highway infrastructure is sunk and 
long-lived, and willingness to pay is uncertain (Poole, 2005a). A public financing option 
was chosen for Highway 407 because Canadian companies were seen to be risk averse, 
and would demand a provincial guarantee (Mylvaganam and Borins, 2004, p.39). 
Proposals to build a corridor from Lewis County in Washington State to Canada, and a 
system of express toll lanes for Minneapolis-St. Paul, were cancelled after studies 
concluded that they could not be self-financing from user fees. 
To reduce risks, governments have granted protection against competition.35 A “non-
compete” clause was included in the contract for SR-91which precluded capacity 
improvements to the freeway until 2030. But rapid traffic growth in the corridor led to 
severe congestion on the untolled lanes, and in 2003 the Orange County Transportation 
Authority took over the highway. According to Poole (2005b), the California 
Department of Transport (Caltrans) agreed to the non-compete clause because there was 
no precedent for SR-91 in the US, and it was not realised that some commuters are 
willing to pay appreciable tolls to save travel time. Current practice is less generous 
with respect to protection from competition. 
To contain monopoly power, two regulatory models have been employed in North 
America. One form is rate-of-return regulation, which was applied to SR-91. This 
model allows operators to implement time-of-day pricing relatively freely. The second 
model is toll regulation, with maximum tolls determined by traffic levels and an 
inflation index. This model, which is applied on Highway 407, is designed to provide 
users with more assurance about future toll levels. The regulations for Highway 407 
stipulate that tolls can be raised only if a minimum36 traffic level is met, and capacity 
expansion is required if flow exceeds 1,700 vehicles per lane-hour for more than 125 
hours in a calendar year. 
                                                 
35 Private highways generally face less competition in European countries than in North America because 
a larger fraction of public highways is tolled. 
36 See Mylvaganam and Borins (2004, pp.95-96). Interestingly, this policy contrasts with Interstate 15 (a 
public operated facility), which is required by law to maintain level of service C and is therefore 
constrained (on a real time basis) by a ceiling on traffic volume. 
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Besides competition clauses and regulations, another design question in privatising 
roads is whether to grant concessions only for individual roads or for networks. Both 
approaches are taken internationally (Estache et al., 2000). One consideration is the 
trade off between the disadvantage of networks in conveying greater monopoly power, 
and the advantage that the operator will internalise the complementarity in demand 
between links. The Ontario provincial government may be at a bargaining disadvantage 
vis à vis the incumbent operator, Highway 407 International, if Highway 407 is ever 
extended because the new segment would be less valuable to a new contractor than to 
the incumbent.37 
Yet another consideration is foreign involvement. Most toll-road projects in the US 
and Canada involve large foreign partners because of their experience and ability to 
absorb risks (Orski, 2005). One potential drawback is illustrated by an ongoing dispute 
over toll regulations between Highway 407 International and the Ontario government. A 
Spanish firm holds an interest in the consortium, and the Spanish government 
threatened to disrupt free-trade negotiations unless the problem was resolved.38 
On balance, the future for private-sector engagement in highway financing and 
operation appears to be relatively bright in the US. The picture is not as clear for 
Canada. According to Nix (2001, p.58) recent enthusiasm for a commercial approach to 
roads in Canada is driven by fiscal restraints and “does not appear to have been driven 
by any reliance on economic principles or regard to the recommendations of 
Commissions.” There appears to be a reluctance in Canada to part from a tradition of 
publicly operated and toll-free roads. In 2003, the British Columbia provincial 
government formulated a plan to privatise the Coquihalla highway on a 55-year lease. 
But it backed down in the face of massive opposition. As another example, a PPP 
contract to Design, Build, Finance and Operate part of a ring road in Edmonton, 
Alberta, was recently signed that “does not allow tolls or advertising to generate 
revenue”.39 
 
 
5. Long-run prospects for road pricing 
 
A number of experts have predicted that road pricing will never be widespread in the 
US.40 Arnott (2005) also sounds a cautionary note, identifying as his main concerns that 
congestion pricing may not reduce congestion very much, that tolling may exacerbate 
other distortions, and that implementation will be impeded by political barriers and high 
infrastructure and administration costs. 
 
The brief review of evidence in this article indicates that the prospects for extensive 
road pricing in Canada in the near future are slim. Strong preferences for public funding 
are one factor. Another is that traffic volumes on most Canadian roads are insufficient 
to justify tolls, at least for the purpose of congestion pricing. Recent experience with the 
Value Pricing Pilot Program suggests, however, a more positive assessment for the US. 
                                                 
37 Mylvaganam and Borins (2004, p.125). 
38 Mylvaganam and Borins (2004, p.96 ff). 
39 Alberta Infrastructure (2005, p.41). 
40 See for example Giuliano (1992), Gillen (1997), Small and Gómez-Ibáñez (1999), Meyer (1999) and 
Downs (2004). 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 31 (2005): 46-66 
 63
Several VPPP projects have been surprisingly successful, and public support for road 
pricing has gained momentum. A strength of the VPPP, which it shares with the 
American economy at large, is its experimental and varied approach that facilitates 
identification of winning (and losing) strategies at relatively low cost. One of the 
lessons is that resistance to road pricing can be overcome by careful design of schemes 
and extensive marketing campaigns that engage the public. Another is that sophisticated 
dynamic congestion pricing is technologically feasible and politically acceptable. A 
third encouraging trend in the US is growth in private-sector involvement with road 
pricing. 
It has been argued that congestion is less localised in North America than in Europe, 
and that consequently road pricing is less cost effective on the western side of the 
Atlantic. However, to the extent that auto travel is underpriced in North America 
compared to Europe, the case for road pricing may actually be stronger. A cautiously 
optimistic view is that road pricing may eventually be applied on much of the US road 
network, although implementation is likely to be punctuated by setbacks, and to be 
influenced by economic factors such as the business cycle and budgetary pressures on 
governments. In 1994 the National Research Council-sponsored congestion pricing 
study panel wrote41 
 
“The risks associated with congestion pricing and the nature of policy development 
in a pluralistic society imply that this policy will progress in small steps. Given that 
congestion pricing represents a substantial change from the current operation of the 
road system, such small steps are appropriate. If individual projects succeed, they 
will help convince policy makers and the public of the benefits of congestion 
pricing. This process will take time, however; thus it may be many more years 
before congestion pricing would be applied throughout a metropolitan area in this 
country. Whether congestion pricing will evolve to this level will depend on how it 
is implemented, how well it works, and how much motorists and voters come to 
accept it. Only time, experimentation, and careful evaluation will tell.” 
 
Although these words were written over a decade ago, they still sum up rather well 
the state of road pricing today. 
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